在职搜寻对跨期投资和高管薪酬的影响.pdf

在职搜寻对跨期投资和高管薪酬的影响 杨国庆，唐万生，赵瑞清 天津大学管理与经济学部，天津市　300072 摘要：本文研究了一类公司所有者雇佣一个了解跨期投资项目收益的高管的跨期投资问题。公 司高管不仅在每一期付出工作努力，而且可以在第一期进行工作搜寻来提高第二期的外部选 项。本文研究了在职搜寻努力对于高管的薪酬合同和公司的投资决策的影响。通过比较不具有 在职搜寻行为模型，在高管具有在职搜寻行为的情况下，高管获得更高水平的激励合同。具体 的讲，高管在第一期的分红比例在具有在职搜寻行为的情况下会更高，而第二期的分红比例与 没有搜寻行为时是一样的。数值试验表明：在高管具有在职搜寻行为的情况下的投资门槛没有 在职搜寻情况下会提高。同时，投资门槛会随着工作努力与在职搜寻努力的相关度增加而增 加，而并关于风险态度并没有单调关系。进一步，在不管高管是否具有在职搜寻行为，投资情 形下的分红比率都要比不投资情形下低。 关键词：跨期投资，分红比率，在职搜寻，合同理论，道德风险 中图分类号：C971, F016 Impact of on-the-job search on intertemporal investment and managerial compensation YANG Guoqing , TANG Wansheng ，ZHAO Ruiqing College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, Abstract: This paper addresses an intertemporal investment problem, in which a firm owner hires a manager having superior information on the profitability of the intertemporal investment project. Besides exerting costly work effort in each period, the manager also takes an on-the-job search effort to enhance his outside option. We investigate how the on-the-job search effort affects the managerial compensation contracts and the firm’s investment decisions. Comparing with a benchmark setting without on-the-job search, when the manager has the opportunity of on-the-job search, the firm owner should offer a higher compensation contract to the manager in order to retain him than that in the case of without on-the-job search. Specifically, the firm owner will offer a higher bonus share rate than that in the case of without on-the-job search in the first period and the same bonus share rate in the second period. Moreover, numerical experiments indicate that the threshold of investment decision in the case of on-the-job search is larger than the one without job search. Meanwhile, the - 1 - threshold of investment decision increases with the independence of work effort and job search eff