PrePearl Harbor Attack ntelligenceImportance amp; Availability前珍珠港袭击情报——重要性amp;可用性.docxVIP

PrePearl Harbor Attack ntelligenceImportance amp; Availability前珍珠港袭击情报——重要性amp;可用性.docx

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PrePearlHarborAttackntelligenceImportance

Pre-Pearl Harbor Attack Intelligence—Importance Availabilityby Tom KimmelThis paper seeks to address two questions:1. Why was pre-Pearl Harbor attack intelligence important; and2.What pre-Pearl Harbor attack intelligence was available to U. S. Intelligence, i.e., were there indications of the time, place, reason, and deceit plan to cover the attack?WhyPre-Pearl Harbor Attack Intelligence Was ImportantDuring 1940 President Roosevelt decided to base the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian island of Oahu in order to deter Japanese aggression. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet, Admiral J. O. Richardson, protested this decision with such vigor it caused him to be relieved of command. He believed that the readiness of men and ships of the Fleet for war operations would impress Japan more than its presence in Hawaii, where facilities to render it ready for war were inferior to those available on the west coast. On February 1,1941, hewas replaced by Admiral Husband Kimmel.Pearl Harbor was a deficient Fleet base, with its Fleet movements exposed to Japanese spies. The Armys equipment for antiaircraft defense was meager. The local Army-Navy defense forces did not have sufficient long-range patrol planes to perform effective distant reconnaissance, even if the patrol planes of the Fleet were made available to augment the handful of Army reconnaissance planes.Under these circumstances, the position of the Fleet in the Hawaiian area was inherently dangerous. The Fleet would sacrifice its preparations and mobility for war, if it concentrated its resources on the defense of its base, which was an Army responsibility, and the reason the Army was in Hawaii.By letter, dated February 7, 1941, Army Chief of Staff Marshall told the Army Hawaiian Commander, General Short, that, “The fullest protection for the Fleet isthe rather than a major consideration for us.”Moreover, with only four tankers suitable for fueling ships at sea, ships of the Fleet had to come i

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