伦比亚大学dutta教授的strategies and games theory and practice精品.pdfVIP

A Strategic Analysis of Global Warming: Theory and Some Numbers Prajit K. Dutta* and Roy Radner** August 11, 2002. This Version: March 5, 2005*** Abstract. We model the global warming process as a dynamic commons game in which the players are countries, their actions at each date produce emissions of greenhouse gases, and the state variable is the current stock of greenhouse gases. The theoretical analysis is complemented by a calibration exercise. The Örst set of results establishes theoretically and then empirically the over-emissions due to a tragedy of the commons. The power of simple sanctions to lower emissions and increase welfare is then examined as is the e§ect of cost asymmetry. Finally, a complete theoretical charactrization is provided for the best equilibrium and it is shown that it has a very simple structure; it involves a constant emission rate through time. JEL Numbers - D900, Q540, C730 Keywords - Global Warming, Dynamic Games, Tragedy of the Common, Calibration * Department of Economics, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027; email: pkd1@ (Author for correspondence purposes.) **Stern School of Business, New York, University, New York, NY 10012; email: rradner@ 1. Introduction 1.1. Background and Principal Issues. The gravest environmental challenge facing humanity today is global climate change.1 Its costs are potentially huge and its e§ect worldwide.2 Furthermore, there is time-pressure on the worldís governments to deal with the problem now. ***This paper has beneÖtted from the comments of