基于分配决策理论的公司财权分配研究.docVIP

基于分配决策理论的公司财权分配研究 ZHENG Li-qun1, XIA Qing2, WU Yu-hua1 1 School of Management, Tianjin University, P.R.China, 300072 2 Tianjin Branch, China Construction Bank, P.R.China, 300203 摘要：指出公司治理的本质是财权分配问题，可分为分配机制决策和策略决策两个层次。首先以分配决策理论为平台，建立了以异质贡献为基础的财权分配模型。提出公司财权分配机制设计应遵循以下三原则：依照公平性要求，按利益相关各方对公司价值增值的“贡献”分配财务收益权，这是财权分配的首要原则；依照效率性要求，应合理分配财务控制权，实现财务收益权和财务控制权的基本对应；在信息不对称的情况下，应通过设计激励合同，使代理人与委托人目标相一致。其次，结合我国股份公司存在的二元股权结构现象，分析了股份公司的财权分配方式在公平性与效率性方面存在的问题及解决途径，指出同股同酬的平均分配机制并不是真正公平的分配方法。最后讨论如何在信息不对称条件下设计激励合同，指出在双重委托代理关系中，应针对经营者和大股东设计双重激励合同。 关键词：财权分配，委托代理问题，分配决策理论 Abstract: The financial claim assignment is the essence of corporate governance. It can be divided into two kinds of decisions. One is allocation rules decision, the other is supply decision. Based on the allocation decision theory, a distribution model of the heterogeneous contribution is set up. Three principles of the financial claim assignment mechanism are put forward. Firstly, in the effort to meet the equity principle, the financial claim should be assigned according to the stake-holder’s contribution on the value-added of their company. Secondly, in the effort to meet the efficiency principle, the claim of the financial residual and the financial domination should be corresponded. Thirdly, because the information is asymmetric between the operators and the shareholders, it is necessary for the companies to design incentive contracts in order to make their objective coincident. Considering the duality ownership structure in the joint-stock companies in China, the equity and efficiency of the financial claim assignment are analyzed. It is indicated that the average method is not really equitable. The design of the incentive contracts in case of information asymmetry is discussed in detail. It is also point out that the incentive contracts should be designed for both operators and the controlling shareholders. Keywords: corporate financial claim assignment, principal-agent theory, allocation decision theory 1公司治理的本质--财