筛选合同在减少生态补偿中信息租金的应用——以甘州区为例-application of screening contract in reducing information rent in ecological compensation - a case study of ganzhou district.docxVIP

泛存在于社会、经济和与之相关的各个领域，信息租金的出现严重影响交易双方的公平性和交易的持续性。 关键词：筛选合同；信息租金；委托—代理理论；甘州区AbstractAsymmetric information exists in socio-economic fields widely, the information rental caused by asymmetric information problems seriously affect implementation of the performance in the economic system, socio-economic areas. To this end, the models in the incomplete contracts of theory contract theory solve the many problems of information rental, these models is to study the binding characteristics of incentive, to make full use of the results of game theory and methods, specific research information in the agency relationship and incentive problems.This is the first concern of ecological compensation of the information asymmetry, use the proposed method of screening contracts based on principal-agent model. As the parties involved in ecological compensation is the relationship which is compensation and to compensation ,the focus is how to reveal the true state of low ability agents, and encourage them participation in this program. so the method of screening contracts solve whose main interest was compensation for to tell the truth, the results need to be compensated the amount of compensation calculated by selecting the party really, in order to reduce information rent will be have the (L) low opportunity cost types of farmers and (H) high opportunity costtype of farmers, we will design two types of contracts: the seller of high-yield low-cost type of contract (L-type contract) , high-cost low-output type of contract (H-type contracts). L-type contract is to reveal the types of farmers with low opportunity cost; H-type contract is to reveal the high opportunity cost of farm households, that is H-type farmers. These two types of contracts must have two features: to encourage farmers to actively participate in and encourage farmers to tell the truth, that is, participation constraints and incentive constraints. To encourage active participation of farmers, L