财务会计理论(司可脱)PPT文件09_scott_im_ch09.pptVIP

Conflict Resolution Game Theory Agency Theory Agency Theory A principal wants to hire an agent for some specialized task Separation of ownership and control Principal and agent are rational. Agent is risk-averse. Principal may be risk-averse, but assume risk-neutral for simplicity Principal wants agent to work hard, but Agent is effort-averse Moral Hazard Problem of Information Asymmetry  Principal cannot observe manager effort - call it a Call manager’s disutility of effort V(a) More effort--- greater disutility Implies manager may shirk on effort E.g., if paid a fixed salary, how hard will the manager work? Agency Contract Example 9.3 Owner: rational, risk-neutral Wants to max. expected firm payoff x Manager: rational, risk-averse and effort-averse Wants to max. expected utility of compensation c, net of disutility of effort V(a) To overcome shirking, why not give manager a share of payoff? Agency Contract Example 9.3 A problem arises: Firm payoff not known until after contract expires (single period contract). Why? Manager has to be paid at contract expiry A solution: Base manager compensation on a performance measure (e.g., net income), which is available at period end Timeline for Agency Example Motivation of Manager Effort To motivate manager effort, give manager a share of firm net income Concept of reservation utility, call it R If manager is to work for owner, must receive expected utility of at least R Assumptions for Agency Contract Example 9.3 Manager has 2 effort choices: Work hard (a1 ) Shirk (a2 ) If manager works hard, payoff is x = 100 with prob. 0.6 x = 50 with prob. 0.4 If manager shirks, payoff is x = 100 with prob. 0.4 x = 50 with prob. 0.6 Assumptions, cont’d. Manager’s contract (linear): c = ky, 0 ≤ k ≤ 1, where y is net income Manager’s reservation utility: R = 3 Quality of net income y (noisy, but unbiased, e.g., fair value accounting) If x is going to be 100 y = $125 with prob. 0.5 y = $75 with prob. 0.5 If x is going to b