中级微观课件·范里安版第35章讲义幻灯片.pptVIP

Manipulating Preferences These are truthful preferences. Bob introduces a new alternative and then lies. Manipulating Preferences These are truthful preferences. Bob introduces a new alternative and then lies. Rank-order vote results. x-score = 8 y-score = 7 z-score = 6 ?-score = 9 z wins!! Demand Revelation A scheme that makes it rational for individuals to reveal truthfully their private valuations of a public good is a revelation mechanism. E.g. the Groves-Clarke taxation scheme. How does it work? Demand Revelation N individuals; i = 1,…,N. All have quasi-linear preferences. vi is individual i’s true (private) valuation of the public good. Individual i must provide ci private good units if the public good is supplied. Demand Revelation ni = vi - ci is net value, for i = 1,…,N. Pareto-improving to supply the public good if Demand Revelation ni = vi - ci is net value, for i = 1,…,N. Pareto-improving to supply the public good if Demand Revelation If andor andthen individual j is pivotal; i.e. changes the supply decision. Demand Revelation What loss does a pivotal individual j inflict on others? Demand Revelation What loss does a pivotal individual j inflict on others? If then is the loss. Demand Revelation What loss does a pivotal individual j inflict on others? If then is the loss. If then is the loss. Demand Revelation For efficiency, a pivotal agent must face the full cost or benefit of her action. The GC tax scheme makes pivotal agents face the full stated costs or benefits of their actions in a way that makes these statements truthful. Demand Revelation The GC tax scheme: Assign a cost ci to each individual. Each agent states a public good net valuation, si. Public good is supplied if otherwise not. Demand Revelation A pivotal person j who changes the outcome from supply to not supplypays a tax of Demand Revelation A pivotal pers