我国税收腐败的委托代理理论分析.pdfVIP

Abstract PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF TAX CORRUPTION IN CHINA ABSTRACT The problems of tax corruption are common all over of the world. In our country, the tax loss caused by the corrupt tax collectors and tax inspectors is huge. This article abstracts the tax corruption problems and views the problems as the collusions among tax payers, tax collectors and tax inspectors. It models the process of the tax corruption and analyzes how the wages paid to and the supervision of the tax collectors and tax inspectors influence the behaviors of the agents. It also analyzes how the corruption of the tax collectors and tax inspectors impacts the goal of the government tax collection, and the costs for the government to fight tax corruption. The conclusions of this article show that, under certain conditions, increasing the wages of the tax collectors and tax inspectors or strengthening the supervision of the tax collectors and tax inspectors may decrease the level of the tax corruption. However, under other conditions such as the condition of tax collectors owning the chances of inner promotion, strengthening the supervision of the tax inspectors may II Abstract increase the level of corruption of the tax collectors. It means that strengthening the supervision of the tax collectors or the tax inspector may not always effectively fight the tax corruption. In the period of the tax collection, the goal of the government is to maximize the total net tax revenue. But the tax corruption will influence the achievement of this goal. To some