贸易、竞争和反倾销—打破僵局外文翻译.docVIP

外文翻译 Material Source: International Trade Author: Ralf Boscheck At the beginning of the 1990s, the WTO counted in total 405 antidumping orders, 193 of which were protecting US markets; by 1997, the United States accounted for 294 out of, in total, 832 orders. While the US had been the most active user of antidumping in the ten years to 1987, emerging markets such as India, Mexico, Argentina and Brazil have since become increasingly important users of antidumping proceedings? Still in 1999, with the total number of antidumping investigations rising to 328 from an annual average of 232 for the preceding three years, traditional users (the USA, EU, Australia, Canada) accounted for 46%, with the EU taking first place. Clearly, WTO-condoned antidumping action has spread to become the global trade remedy of choice. It is also a very costly one for most parties involved. Restricting imports affects domestic competition, income distribution and incentives across a range of interrelated markets and sectors and fuels costly, “rent-seeking” activities just to maintain the “benefits of protection”. Aggregating these various factors, the net economic costs of current US antidumping and countervailing duty actions are estimated to be $ 4 billion per annum. Of the about 250 antidumping petitions filed by US steel producers since 1980, around one hundred are still enforced twenty years later. They currently “protect” less than 0.1% of the US labor force at an estimated 40% cost-penalty to steel consuming sectors employing more than 50 times as many workers? Similar efforts in the 1980s to protect the US car industry cut consumers real incomes between US$ 3.50 and US$ 5.50 for each dollar of added profit; each job saved cost consumers between US$ 93,000 and US$ 250,000 per year. Comparable figures can be found for most economies delaying adjustments while claiming to benefit from free trade. But even more concerning than the evident resource waste, the rationale for i