外包与外商直接投资的产业平衡外文翻译.docVIP

外文翻译 aterial Source: NBER Working Paper No.W9300 Author: Gene M. Grossman Abstract We study the determinants of the extent of outsourcing and of direct foreign investment in an industry in which producers need specialized components. Potential suppliers must make a relationship-specific investment in order to serve each prospective customer. Such investments are governed by imperfect contracts. A final-good producer can manufacture components for itself, but the per-unit cost is higher than for specialized suppliers. We consider how the size of the cost differential, the extent of contractual incompleteness, the size of the industry, and the relative wage rate affect the organization of industry production. （JEL:F12，F23，F23，D23） 1. Introduction International outsourcing and FDI (foreign direct investment) have been growing around the globe. Firms outsource an expanding range of activities, such as the production of intermediate inputs and after-sale services. Audet (1996), Campa and Goldberg (1997), Feenstra (1998), Hummels et al. (2001) and Yeats (2001) have documented this phenomenon. Firms also expand foreign direct investment. Although the debate on whether most FDI is horizontal or vertical has not been settled, it is evident that the production of inputs is an important activity of foreign subsidiaries, and that this activity has been growing fast. Hanson, Mataloni, Jr., and Slaughter (2001) provide evidence of this expansion for U.S. based firms. A growing literature is attempting to clarify the sources of these trends. Traditional models of international trade have been modified by Jones (2000) to deal with trade in intermediate inputs, while Grossman and Helpman (2002a) have developed a model of monopolistic competition in which international outsourcing of inputs competes with domestic outsourcing. These are examples of a more general trend to develop an understanding of the organization of production, which includes the work of Aghion and Tirole (1995), M