普格尔《国际贸易（第17版）》 英文手册Pugel_17e_chap010_IM.docxVIP

PAGE 76 ? 2016 by McGraw-Hill Education. ?This is proprietary material solely for authorized instructor use. Not authorized for sale or distribution in any manner. ?This document may not be copied, scanned, duplicated, forwarded, distributed, or posted on a website, in whole or part.? Chapter 10 Arguments for and against Protection Overview This chapter has three purposes: To present a framework and a rule for evaluating arguments offered in favor of limiting imports, to apply the framework and rule to several prominent arguments for protection, and to examine the political processes that result in government policies toward imports. The framework allows us to look at situations in which the free market may not result in economic efficiency, because of distortions that result from market failures or from efficiency-reducing government policies. In the “first-best” world with no distortions, private marginal benefits (MB) to consumers who make buying decisions equal social marginal benefits (SMB), because there are no positive externalities or spillovers, private marginal costs (MC) recognized by sellers equal social marginal costs (SMC), because there are no negative externalities or spillovers, and all of these are equal to market price, because the market is perfectly competitive and there are no distorting government policies like a tax or a subsidy. When external costs, external benefits, monopoly power, monopsony power, a distorting tax, or a distorting subsidy exists, the market usually does not yield the first-best outcome, because social marginal benefit does not equal social marginal cost. In situations in which the free-market outcome is second-best because of a market failure, there is a potential role for government policy to contribute to economic efficiency. We mention the approach of creating new property rights, but we focus in this chapter on the tax-or-subsidy approach to eliminate distortions in private incentives. In such a situation, a que