股利所得税、管理层持股和公司股利政策-金融学专业论文.docxVIP

重庆大学 重庆大学硕士学位论文 英文摘要 PAGE PAGE VI ABSTRACT In recent years, equity incentive spreads as a corporate governance mechanism to motivate managers and reduce agency costs and is adopted by more and more listed companies. In all authorized equity incentive plans, half of the plans using restricted stock as the incentive. Managerial ownership has two effects, interest convergence effect and entrenchment effect. If the equity incentive is not designed properly, leading entrenchment effect to dominate, the equity incentive plan cannot take effect as expected. Therefore, it is necessary to research the effect of managerial ownership on corporate governance. This paper researches the effect of managerial ownership on corporate governance from the aspect of the effect of managerial ownership on dividend policies. Based on summary of relative theories on managerial ownership, dividend policies and dividend taxation, this paper analyzes effects of managerial ownership on dividend policies when the dividend tax changes. The analysis shows that when the dividend tax rises, dividend payment will be decreased whether managerial ownership is high or low. When the dividend tax is reduced, managers with high share ownership would like to increase dividend payment out of self-interest; mangers with low share ownership may increase dividend payment under pressure of large shareholders or not change the dividend policy. 2005 dividend tax cut(Caishui[2005]102) reduced the dividend tax from 20% to 10%. This paper uses this event of change of the dividend tax to research whether the effect of managerial ownership on dividend policies has changed after the event and analyzes the effect of managerial ownership on corporate governance according to the result. The main empirical results of this paper are as follows: The dividend tax cut caused the mangers who own shares to increase the dividend payment. The 2001-2004 sample shows that managerial ownership did not affect dividend payment propen