企业内部治理研究中英文外文文献翻译2017.docVIP

本科毕业设计（论文） 中英文对照翻译 (此文档为word格式,下载后您可任意修改编辑!) 文献出处：Park Myer. The internal governance of firms [J]. The Journal of Finance, 2017, 1(3): 689-720. 原文 The Research of Internal Governance of Firms Park Myer We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. Internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by investors. External governance, even if crude and uninformed, can complement internal governance and improve efficiency. This leads to a theory of investment and dividend policy, in which dividends are paid by self-interested CEOs to maintain a balance between internal and external control. The people you pay are more important over time than the people who pay you. A PUBLIC CORPORATION is commonly viewed as an organization run by CEOs and monitored by a board of directors on behalf of shareholders. This governance structure separates decision management (by the CEO and other managers) from decision control (by the board) and from investment and risk-bearing (by public shareholders), and is viewed as reasonable and efficient (Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b) and Jensen (2000)) provided that decisions are made to maximize the value of shareholders’ residual claim. Many public corporations thrive under this governance structure. Yet the clear evidence that public corporations “work” has to be set against the equally clear evidence that most shareholders have little control over boards (Monks (2008)) and that many boards treat CEOs generously (Bebchuk and Fried (2004)). CEOs are self interested, and hence not automatically faithful servants of the shareholders (Jensen (1986, 1993), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny(1990), and Shleifer and Vishny (1989, 1997)). The market for corporate control can provide some discipline, but it is hard to see it as effective in controlling operational decisi