指称、意向性和纯意向对象.pdf

Studies in Logic, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2017): 128-149 PII:1674-3202(2017)-01-0128-22 Reference, Intentionality, and Purely Intentional Objects Olav Asheim Department of Philosophy, University o f Oslo Department o f Philosophy, Nanjing University olav.asheim@ifikk.uio.no Abstract. There are two big obstacles to making sense of quantification into belief and other propositional attitude contexts: one that the object referred to may not exist, the other that the principle of substitutivity of co-referential terms breaks down in such contexts. I shall argue in this paper that the first problem can be solved by recognizing objects of belief as entities that can be referred to regardless of whether they exist, and I shall sketch a theory of existentials that makes this plausible. In addition I shall argue that demonstrative reference is not in itself direct reference, and I shall argue that there is no problem of substitutivity when the co-referential terms in question are both used directly referentially. 1 Introduction The ideas I am about to present in this paper come from an origin long ago. I started to think along these lines when I was working on my master thesis, which had as its topic Quine5s philosophy oflanguage and mind. That was in 1968. I expressed my thoughts in a more mature form in my doctoral dissertation Reference and Inten­ tionality, which was published as a book by Solum Forlag in 1992.1 The book has later been translated to Chinese, and was published by Nanjing University Press in 2014. My ideas are a reaction to the problems that arise when we try to make sense of quantification into belief and other attitude contexts, and meant to be a solution to them.