金融市场与金融机构（原书第9版）题库chapter 18.docVIP

PAGE 17 Copyright ? 2018 Pearson Education, Inc. Financial Markets and Institutions, 9e (Mishkin) Chapter 18 Financial Regulation 18.1 Multiple Choice 1) During the boom years of the 1920s, bank failures were quite A) uncommon, averaging less than 30 per year. B) uncommon, averaging less than 100 per year. C) common, averaging about 600 per year. D) common, averaging about 2,000 per year. Answer: C Topic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information as a Rationale for Financial Regulation Question Status: Previous Edition 2) When one party to a transaction has incentives to engage in activities detrimental to the other party, there exists a problem of A) moral hazard. B) split incentives. C) ex ante shirking. D) precontractual opportunism. Answer: A Topic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information as a Rationale for Financial Regulation Question Status: Previous Edition 3) Moral hazard is an important consequence of insurance arrangements because the existence of insurance A) provides increased incentives for risk taking. B) impedes efficient risk taking. C) causes the private cost of the insured activity to increase. D) does both A and B of the above. E) does both B and C of the above. Answer: A Topic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information as a Rationale for Financial Regulation Question Status: Previous Edition 4) The existence of deposit insurance can increase the likelihood that depositors will need deposit protection, as banks with deposit insurance A) are likely to take on greater risks than they otherwise would. B) are likely to be too conservative, reducing the probability of turning a profit. C) are likely to regard deposits as an unattractive source of funds due to depositors demands for safety. D) are placed at a competitive disadvantage in acquiring funds. Answer: A Topic: Chapter 18.1 Asymmetric Information as a Rationale for Financial Regulation Question Status: Previous Edition 5) Although the FDIC was created to prevent bank failures, its existe