应收账款融资和信息不对称.docVIP

本科毕业论文（设计） 外 文 翻 译 原文： Accounts Receivable Financing and Information Asymmetry Abstract：This study investigates the effect of information asymmetry between managers and outsiders on the use of accounts receivable in financing the firm’s operations. The information impounded in receivables pertains to the firm’s customers rather than the firm and therefore differs from the information embedded in other assets. The unique information content of accounts receivable makes it a likely candidate to use as a financing tool for highly information asymmetric firms. Consistent with the Pecking Order Theory, I find that the likelihood of using accounts receivable financing increases with the firm’s information asymmetry. I also find that the innate component of the firm’s earnings quality measure is more influential than the discretionary component in explaining the use of AR financing. Keywords: Information asymmetry, capital structure, asset-backed financing, receivables. 1. Introduction Accounts receivable (hereafter, AR) are open accounts owed to the firm by trade customers. They are part of the firm’s working capital and constitute 14 percent of 2005 US industrial firms’ total assets, making them one of the largest asset groups on industrial firms’ balance sheet. AR serve as a tool for firms to extend credit to their business partners and are often instrumental in facilitating sale of goods. From a creditor standpoint, the information characteristics associated with AR differ from other firm’s assets. While the information on firm’s other assets is related to the firm’s performance, the information on the firm’s AR and their value depends on other firms’ performance, i.e. the customers. Furthermore, AR share many attributes of financial assets, including their reparability and relative liquidity. These attributes of AR, as well as the diversification effect of multiple customers comprising the receivable account on the balance sheet, make this asset different and pot