公司治理、产品市场竞争对盈余管理影响的分析-会计学专业论文.docxVIP

Ab Abstract PAGE PAGE IV Abstract Since the beginning of the 21st century, scandals occur frequently. American ENRON Company events, Highne of Zheda, Meiya of Guangdong and other corporate scandals in recent shows once again that: The root of the problem enterprises is not the information disclosure system or the corporate accounting department, but in the confusion of corporate governance of enterprises. Information can change peoples behavior, and the same is true of accounting information. The main function of accounting information is reflected in the usefulness of the two aspects of fiduciary responsibility and decision-making. Surplus information is the most important type of information in the accounting information. earnings information management is an enterprise behavior. Business management authorities in order to get a satisfactory financial results, often with the accounting methods and management tools to affect the surplus so as to achieve their own purposes. Earnings management although has two sides sex, accounting policies and regulations permit, but the earnings management behavior is a kind of contrary to the quality characteristic of accounting information behavior. Earnings management hinders accounting information neutrality, affects the reliability and relevance of accounting information, so as to mislead consumers, leading to irrational allocation of resources. Enterprises in different product level of competition, the main risks are different, which lead to the organizational structure of the enterprise, management means and the strategic target of the change, the effect of corporate governance mechanism. Therefore in the suppression of earnings management, product market competition and corporate governance there exist certain relationship. In this paper, according to the Fen Dahl index, product market competition is divided into competitive industries and less competitive industry. On this basis, according to the different degree of c