组织经济学与管理学ch06 Hidden action problem.pptVIP

Chapter 6 Hidden action problem George Hendrikse Incentives Figure 6.1: Decision order and complete information The principal values a good result (p=30) more than a bad result (p=10), whereas the agent rather delivers a low effort (e=0) than a high effort (e=1). The conflict of interests expresses itself in the fact that an increase in e, which is unattractive for the agent, means that p=30 becomes more likely, which is attractive for the principal. This conflict of interest contrast may result in non acceptance of the contract by the agent, even though executing the transaction would create a surplus. It is also possible that the agent does accept the assignment, but shows bad performance (‘Moral Hazard’). An efficient allocation of risk implies that the principal bears all the uncertainty, i.e. paying a fixed salary, because the principal is risk-neutral and the agent risk-averse. Efficient performance incentives entail that the agent is stimulated to perform well. This happens in the model above, when the agent is rewarded on the basis of realised outcomes. This goes with uncertainty for the agent because the result is also determined by external circumstances. Example: Tonsils and open-heart surgery A surgeon paid per open-heart surgery does twice as many operations than a surgeon with a fixed salary. A surgeon paid per tonsils surgery, does 15 times as many operations than a surgeon with a fixed salary. Figure 6.7: Decision order and asymmetric information An uncertain reward (‘0 with probability 1/3’ and ‘9 with probability 2/3’, which costs the principal 1/3*0 + 2/3*9 = 6) is valued lower by the agent than a certain reward (‘6 with chance 1’ which costs the principal 6). The uncertain outcome ‘0 with probability 1/3 and 9 with probability 2/3’ (which costs the principal 6) is worth 2 for the agent, which is the same as a salary ‘4 with chance 1’, which only costs the principal 4. The principal does not offer a fixed salary {4,4} because the a