管理者能力对管理层业绩预告行为影响的分析word格式论文.docxVIP

暨南大学硕士学位论文 优秀毕业论文 万方数据 精品参考文献资料 摘要 随着我国证券市场发展越来越完善，投资者对企业信息披露提出了更高的要求，特别 是对盈余进行预测的前瞻性信息。业绩预告作为预测性财务信息的一种，反应企业未来业 绩状况，由于其披露的及时性日益受到投资者的关注。业绩预告信息的披露固然可以减少 信息不对称等问题，但是管理层操纵业绩预告信息披露的现象却时有发生。管理层披露业 绩预告时在形式、精确度等方面进行了选择，没有完全真实地反映企业业绩状况。因此有 必要对管理层业绩预告行为展开研究。 本文从信息不对称理论、委托代理理论、信号传递理论以及有效市场理论等理论出发， 以管理层业绩预告为研究样本，实证检验了管理者能力对管理层业绩预告行为的影响。本 文研究发现管理者能力越强，管理层自愿披露业绩预告动机越强，管理层披露业绩预告的 精确度及准确性也越高。 本文从管理者能力角度出发，研究了管理者能力对管理层业绩预告行为的影响，拓展 了现有信息披露研究视角。本文研究可以在一定程度解释我国上市公司信息披露存在差异 的原因，揭示管理层业绩预告中的个人能力因素，有利于相关部门完善业绩预告制度、提 高监管效率，有助于投资者识别管理者的信息披露风格，使投资者更客观地看待管理者所 披露的信息。 关键词：管理者能力，业绩预告，预告精确度，预告准确性 I Abstract With the rapid development of capital market in China, the requirement of investors for information of the listed company is also increasing, especially for the forecast information. As a kind of predictive financial information, earnings forecast reflects the future profitability of companies, and because of its timeliness, it has been the focus of investors. Even though the earnings forecast can reduce the degree of information asymmetry, there still exists the phenomenon of management manipulating of earnings forecast information. When disclosing earnings forecast, management always chooses the form, the precision, the accuracy of earnings forecast intentionally. As a result, earnings forecast can not fully reflect the real situation of companies. Therefore, it is necessary to study the behavior of management earnings forecast. Based on the theory of information asymmetry, Principal-agent Theory, Efficient Markets Hypothesis and Signal theory, and using management earnings forecast data for the study sample, we empirically study the impact of managerial ability on management earnings forecast behavior. We found that the likelihood of voluntarily issuing management earnings forecast is positively associated with managerial ability. Specifically, more able managers are associated with higher precision and accuracy. From the perspective of managerial ability, we study the impact of manag