控股股东控制权丶现金流权与公司价值——非对称框架下的理论和实证研究.docVIP

控股股东控制权丶现金流权与公司价值——非对称框架下的理论和实证研究 ??控股股东控制权、现金流权与公司价值——非对称框架下的理论和实证研究 112俞红海 徐龙炳 陈百助（11.上海财经大学金融学院，200433；2.美国南加州大学马歇尔商学院，90089） Control right, cash flow right and corporate valuation——Based on asymmetry framework 112Yu Honghai Xu Longbing Chen Baizhu(1. School of Finance, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China； 2. Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, Los Angeles 90089, USA) Abstract: Based on La Porta et al.(1999), this paper studies the relation between control right, cash flow right and corporate valuation, and also considers the effect of investment opportunity. Different from the linear relationship in La Porta et al.(2002), we find out the nonlinear relationship between control right, cash flow right and corporate valuation, and also find out that investment opportunity has asymmetry effect to the incentive effect of cash flow right. Further more, this paper uses the data of 2006-2007 after China Stock Reform to test. We verify the nonlinear relationship between control right, cash flow right and corporate valuation. When control right level is less than 50%, the relationship between control right and valuation is significantly negative, while control right level is over 50%, it will not affect corporate valuation. When cash flow right is less than mean level, cash flow right has no significantly positive relationship with corporate valuation, while over mean level, cash flow right has significantly positive relationship. Besides, when investment opportunity is less than mean level, cash flow right has no incentive effect, while over mean level, cash flow right has incentive effect. Keywords: Ultimate Controlling shareholder; Control right; Cash flow right; corporate valuation JEL classification: G31; G34; G38 作者简介 俞红海，男，浙江嘉兴人，2002年毕业于浙江工业大学，获管理学学士学位，2006年毕业于南京财经大学，获经济学（金融）硕士学位。2006年9月起在上海财经大学金融学院攻读金融学博士学位，其中2007年10月-2008年11月，南加州大学马歇尔商学院访问学者。 徐龙炳，男，江苏丹徒人，金融学博士后，上海财经大学金融学院教授，博士生导师。1984年、1989年毕业于南京师