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China’s Naval Nationalism Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response Robert S. Ross International Security, Volume 34, Number 2, Fall 2009, pp. 46-81 (Article) Published by The MIT Press For additional information about this article /journals/ins/summary/v034/34.2.ross.html Access Provided by Shanghai Jiao Tong University at 04/06/11 8:15AM GMT China’s Naval Nationalism China’s Naval Robert S. Ross Nationalism Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response Since China began its rise to great power status in 1978, U.S.-China relations have avoided much of the instability and great power rivalry associated with the U.S.-Soviet competi- tion. The development of the Chinese economy, the growth of central govern- ment revenues, and annual double-digit increases since the mid-1990s in the Chinese defense budget have yet to yield China military capabilities or great power ambitions that fundamentally affect the regional security order and vi- tal U.S. interests. Nonetheless, recent developments in Chinese politics and defense policy suggest that China will soon embark on a more ambitious maritime policy, be- ginning with the construction of a power-projection navy centered on an air- craft carrier. In so doing, China will follow the example of prior land powers. Just as nationalism and the pursuit of status encouraged past land powers to seek great power maritime capabilities, nationalism, rather than security, is driving China’s naval ambition. And China’s maritime power will be limited by the constraints experienced by all land powers—extensive challenges to ter- ritorial security and a corresponding commitment to a large ground force ca- pability. China’s naval nationalism will nonetheless challenge U.S.-China cooperation. It w