绩效报酬与对高层管理的激励外文文献中英文翻译.doc

外文翻译 原文 Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives. Material Source: EBSCO Author: Michael C· Jensen The conflict of interest between shareholders of a publicly owned corporation and the corporation’s chief executive officer (CEO) is a classic example of a principal-agent problem. If shareholders had complete information regarding the CEO’s activities and the firm’s investment opportunities, they could design a contract specifying and enforcing the managerial action to be taken in each state of the world. Managerial actions and investment opportunities are not, however, perfectly observable by shareholders; indeed ,shareholders do not often know what actions the CEO can take or which of these actions will increase shareholder wealth. In these situations, agency theory predicts that compensation policy will be designed to give the manager incentives to select and implement actions that increase shareholder wealth. Shareholders want CEOs to take particular actions—for example, deciding which issue to work on, which project to pursue, and which to drop—whenever the expected return on the action exceeds the expected costs. But the CEO compares only his private gain and cost from pursuing a particular activity. If one abstracts from the effects of CEO risk aversion, compensation policy that ties the CEO’s welfare to shareholder wealth helps align the private and social costs and benefits of alternative actions and thus provides incentives for CEOs to take appropriate actions. Shareholder wealth is affected by many factors in addition to the CEO, including actions of other executives and employees, demand and supply conditions, and public policy. It is appropriate, however ,to pay CEOs on the basis of shareholder wealth since that is the objective of shareholders. There are many mechanisms through which compensation policy can provide value-increasing incentives, including performance-based bonuses and salary revisions, stock opt