委托代理理论和人工信息不对称外文中英文翻译.doc

外文文献翻译译文 原文: Principal Agent Theory and Artificial Information Asymmetry Principals, agents and asymmetry of information The initial step in developing the original model’s underlying structure is the delegation of tasks to an agent by his or her principal. ‘The relationship of agency is one of the oldest and commonest codified modes of social interaction. We will say that an agency relationship has risen between twoor more parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems’ Ross, 1973, p. 134. This can be motivated by a lack of time or capacity to perform the task themselves or even sheer unwillingness. The key assumption is that agents and principals potentially have conflicting objectives. If conflicting objectives are accompanied by imperfect information about an agent, the principal cannot completely control his or her agent’s performance Laffont and Martimort, 2002. The asymmetrical distribution of information is mainly of a structural nature. However, the information gap is not axiomatic but can under certain circumstances be bridged or mitigated by policing efforts. Even if monitoring is technically feasible, it is assumed to be subject to a cost?benefit analysis that is likely to render it as too costly in highly complex agency relationships. The structural disadvantage of asymmetrical information causes inefficiency and imperfect markets. The principal can apply a costly strategy to elicit private information from his or her chosen agent, thus balancing asymmetrical patterns of information distribution. We distinguish between two modes of asymmetrical information: 1 when action is unobservable to a principal we refer to moral hazard see H?lmstrom, 1979 or hidden action; 2 adverse selection Akerlof, 1970 refers to the risk arising from not knowing the habit and character of agents. It is the principal who bears the cost of asymm