constructive verification, empirical induction, and falibilist deduction a threefold contrast建设性的验证,实证归纳,falibilist扣除3倍的对比.pdfVIP

Information 2011, 2, 635-650; doi:10.3390/info2040635 OPEN ACCESS information ISSN 2078-2489 /journal/information Article Constructive Verification, Empirical Induction, and Falibilist Deduction: A Threefold Contrast Julio Michael Stern ˜ Department of Applied Mathematics, Institute of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Sao Paulo. ˜ ´ ˜ Rua do Matao 1010, Cidade Universitaria. 05508-090, Sao Paulo, Brazil; E-Mail: jmstern@; Fax: +55-11-3819-3922 Received: 9 August 2011; in revised form: 21 October 2011 / Accepted: 26 October 2011 / Published: 31 October 2011 Abstract: This article explores some open questions related to the problem of verification of theories in the context of empirical sciences by contrasting three epistemological frameworks. Each of these epistemological frameworks is based on a corresponding central metaphor, namely: (a) Neo-empiricism and the gambling metaphor; (b) Popperian falsificationism and the scientific tribunal metaphor; (c) Cognitive constructivism and the object as eigen-solution metaphor. Each of one of these epistemological frameworks has also historically co-evolved with a certain statistical theory and method for testing scientific hypotheses, respectively: (a) Decision theoretic Bayesian statistics and Bayes factors; (b) Frequentist statistics and p -values; (c) Constructive Baye