symmetry and evidential support对称和证据支持.pdfVIP

Symmetry 2011, 3, 680-698; doi:10.3390/sym3030680 OPEN ACCESS symmetry ISSN 2073-8994 /journal/symmetry Article Symmetry and Evidential Support Michael G. Titelbaum Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 600 North Park Street, Madison, WI 53706, USA; E-Mail: titelbaum@; Tel. +1-608-263-6708; Fax: +1-608-265-3701 Received: 27 April 2011; in revised form: 25 August 2011 / Accepted: 30 August 2011 / Published: 16 September 2011 Abstract: This article proves that formal theories of evidential favoring must fail because they are inevitably language dependent. I begin by describing Carnap’s early confirmation theories to show how language dependence problems (like Goodman’s grue problem) arise. I then generalize to show that any formal favoring theory satisfying minimal plausible conditions will yield different judgments about the same evidence and hypothesis when they are expressed in alternate languages. This does not just indict formal theories of favoring; it also shows that something beyond our evidence must be invoked to substantively favor one hypothesis over another. Keywords: evidence; evidential support; Carnap; grue; language dependence 1. Introduction We are constantly judging hypotheses in light of evidence, to see whether the evidence supports one hypothesis over another, is better explained by one hypothesis, makes one hypothesis more likely than the other, etc. In doing so we invoke a general evidential favoring relation, according to which an evidential proposition may favor