a systematic review of re-identification attacks on health data系统回顾的鉴定攻击健康数据.pdfVIP

A Systematic Review of Re-Identification Attacks on Health Data 1,2 1 1 3,4 Khaled El Emam *, Elizabeth Jonker , Luk Arbuckle , Bradley Malin 1 Electronic Health Information Laboratory, CHEO Research Institute, Ottawa, Canada, 2 Department of Paediatrics, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada, 3 Department of Biomedical Informatics, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, United States of America, 4 Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, United States of America Abstract Background: Privacy legislation in most jurisdictions allows the disclosure of health data for secondary purposes without patient consent if it is de-identified. Some recent articles in the medical, legal, and computer science literature have argued that de-identification methods do not provide sufficient protection because they are easy to reverse. Should this be the case, it would have significant and important implications on how health information is disclosed, including: (a) potentially limiting its availability for secondary purposes such as research, and (b) resulting in more identifiable health information being disclosed. Our objectives in this systematic review were to: (a) characterize known re-identification attacks on health data and contrast that to re-identification attacks on other kinds of data, (b) compute the overall proportion of records that have been correctly re-identified in these attacks, and (c) assess whether these demonstrate weaknesses in current de- identification methods. Methods and Findings: Searches were conducted in IEEE Xplore, ACM Digital Library, and PubMed. After screening, fourteen eligible articles representing distinct attacks were identified. On average,