Indirect Speech Acts.docVIP

Indirect Speech Acts ? JOHN R. SEARLE ? ? INTRODUCTION ? The simplest cases of meaning are those in which the speaker utters a sentence and means exactly and literally what he says. In such cases the speaker intends to produce a certain Elocutionary effect in the hearer, and he in-tends to produce this effect by getting the Hearer to recognize his intention to produce id and he intends to get the hearer to recognize this intention in virtue of the hearers knowledge of the rules that govern the utterance of the sentence. But notoriously, not all cases of meaning are this simple: In hints, insinuations. irony, and metaphor to mention a few examples-the speakers utterance meaning and the sentence meaning come apart in various ways One important class of such cases is that in which the speaker utters a sentence. means what he says, but also means something more For example. a speaker may utter the sentence I want you to do it by way of requesting the hearer to do something. The utterance is incidentally meant as a statement, but it is also meant primarily as a request. a request made by way of making a statement. In such cases a sentence that contains the illocutionary force indicators for one kind of il1ocution,~ry act can be uttered to perform, IN ADDITION, another type of illocutionary act. There are also cases in which the speaker may utter a sentence and mean what he says and also mean another illocution with a different propositional content. For example, a speaker may utter the sentence Can you reach the salt? and mean it not merely as a question but as a request to pass the salt In such cases it is important to emphasize that the utterance is meant as a request; that is, the speaker intends to produce in the hearer the knowledge that a request has been made to him, and he intends to produce this knowledge by means of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to produce it. Such cases. in which the utterance has two illocutionary forces, are to be sharply dis