The Great Depression in the United States From A Neoclassical Perspective：（在美国大萧条时期的新古典主义的视角）.pdfVIP

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review Winter 1999, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 2–24 The Great Depression in the United States From A Neoclassical Perspective Harold L. Cole Lee E. Ohanian Senior Economist Economist Research Department Research Department Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Abstract Can neoclassical theory account for the Great Depression in the United States— both the downturn in output between 1929 and 1933 and the recovery between 1934 and 1939? Yes and no. Given the large real and monetary shocks to the U.S. economy during 1929–33, neoclassical theory does predict a long, deep downturn. However, theory predicts a much different recovery from this downturn than actually occurred. Given the period’s sharp increases in total factor productivity and the money supply and the elimination of deflation and bank failures, theory predicts an extremely rapid recovery that returns output to trend around 1936. In sharp contrast, real output remained between 25 and 30 percent below trend through the late 1930s. We conclude that a new shock is needed to account for the Depression’s weak recovery. A likely culprit is New Deal policies toward monop- oly and the distribution of income. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System. Between 1929 and 1933, employment fell about 25 per- shocks we consider, none of those shocks can account for cent and output fell about 30 percent in the United States. the 1934–39 recovery. Theory predicts large increases in By 1939, employment and output remained well below employment and output beginning in 1934 that return real their 1929 levels. Why did employm