Game-TheoreticModelsforEffectsofSocialEmbeddedness.pptVIP

Game-Theoretic Models for Effects of Social Embeddedness on Trust and Cooperation Werner Raub;P1 ? T1 ? E1 ? P2;The problem of social order ;The explanatory problem related tosocial dilemma situations;Prisoner’s Dilemma ;Refresher: basic concepts of game theory;Prisoner’s Dilemma ;Prisoner’s Dilemma:no cooperation in single encounters;Conclusion for the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma;Robert Axelrod and “The Evolution of Cooperation” (1984);Michael Taylor and “Anarchy and Cooperation” (1976; rev. ed.: The Possibility of Cooperation”);The repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma ;Repeated interactions as a paradigmatic case of “social embeddedness”;Intuition: why might cooperation be feasible for goal-directed actors in the repeated game?;Types of strategies for the repeated game;A simple but important negative result for the repeated game;Two simple strategies for therepeated Prisoner’s Dilemma;Motivation for analyzing a simplified version of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with only two feasible strategies;Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma ;TFT vs. TFT;TFT vs. TFT;;TFT vs. TFT;ALL D vs. ALL D;ALL D vs. ALL D;ALL D vs. TFT;ALLD vs. TFT;Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma;Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma;Equilibria;Example;Situation 1;Situation 2;Cooperation in repeated social dilemmas: conclusions;Cooperation in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma ;Cooperation in repeated encounters;Testable implications;New Problems ;Game theory and Axelrod’s analysis