The Effects of Competition on Bargaining Power in Repeated Bilateral Negotiations.pdf

The Effects of Competition on Bargaining Power in Repeated Bilateral Negotiations.pdf

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The Effects of Competition on Bargaining Power in Repeated Bilateral Negotiations

The Effects of Competition on Bargaining Power in Repeated Bilateral Negotiations Christian Groh? June 27, 2001 Abstract I model a market with repeated bilateral negotiations, random matching and an option to continue trade with the current partner. Sellers make all offers and have a commonly known value of zero for the good, the buyers have a commonly known value of one. While in a repeated bilateral monopoly situation a buyer can extract all the surplus I show that alternative trading partners in form of unmatched sellers are disadvantageous for the buyers. The result presumes that traders have no information about other traders’ bargaining history. Starting from that observation I allow buyers to compete for currently matched sellers. Competition leads to harsh punishments for a buyer who accepts a seller’s out- of-equilibrium offer. Those harsh punishments ensure that buyers can offset the negative effect which alternative trading partners induce: payoffs exceed those without competition for any discount factor. JEL Classification Numbers: C78, C73, C72, D43. Keywords: noncooperative bargaining, repeated games, collusion, outside op- tions, competition ? Faculty of Economics, Chair Prof. Moldovanu, University of Mannheim, D - 68131 Mannheim, Germany. Tel.: +49 621 181 3421, email: groh@econ.uni-mannheim.de. This paper was written while the author was visiting University College London - whose warm hospitality is gratefully acknowledged - through the ENTER PhD programme. I am especially grateful to Tilman Bo?rgers and Martin Hellwig for their encouragement and generous advice. I have also benefited from the comments of Roman Inderst, Philippe Jehiel, Benny Moldovanu and Ennio Stacchetti and seminar participants at the Economic Theory Workshop in Mannheim and at the ENTER Jamboree 2000 in London. All remaining errors are mine.[bargaining.tex] 1 Introduction Decentralised trading systems are abundant in real world economies. It is hence not surprising that markets

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