双高现象银企博弈与转型经济融资环境影响戴璐.pdfVIP

中国软科学 2010 年第 2期 双高现象银企博弈与转型经济 融资环境的影响 戴 璐 ( 中国人民大学 商学院, 北京 100872) : 中国资本市场长期持续的双高现象, 偏离了公司价 最大化的要求, 其背后是在转型经济的融资环境影 响下银企博弈的结果银行在贷前以及贷后监督角色的欠缺, 给了企业操纵借贷时间传递误导信号的机会, 以 此扩大其当期融资能力并服务于跨期融资当实际控制人具有掏空动机时, 短期借款会明显超过正常经营的需 要在双高后期, 为免各自利益受损, 银企达成合谋, 企业则出现了更为严重的借新还旧 : 双高; 制度环境; 银企博弈; 误导信 号; 超额短期借款; 借新还旧 : F 830. 9 : A : 1002- 9753( 20 10) 02- 0040 - 14 W hy Cash Reserve and Short Term Leverage Simultaneously Overhang am ong Chinese L isted Companies? DA I Lu (B usiness School, R enm in Un iv er sity of Ch ina, B eij ing 100 872, Ch ina) Abstract: T h is paper ami s o ana lyze a pecu liar phenom enon ha 89 lis ed com panies in Ch ina have bo h h igher sho r erm lev erages and cash reserves consecu ively fo rm o re han 2 years. Such financia l pa ern canno be c lea rly expla ined by c lassica l heo ries. In fac, i arises from dynam ic gam ing be w een bankers and rea l con ro llers o f lis ed firm s w ih he ir pursu i s o f ind iv idua l in eres max mi iz a ion under he influence of he rans i ion econom y ins iu ions in Ch ina. The analysis reveals ha he f irm s d isgu ise hem as good ones o avo id f inanc ial cons ra ins and serve he needs o f rea l con rolle rs unne ling. Bu banke rs don see hrough he rick. T ill loan m a ures, f irm s and cred i ors end o consp ire o re f inance he non- perform ing deb o avo id i from be raying clov en hoo f. K ey words: h ighe r shor erm leverage; huge cash reserve; g am ing; disguise signa;l ove rhung bank loan; deb ref inan c ing , ,