从“东锅”股票案看国企经营者激励与约束机制.docVIP

从“东锅”股票案看国企经营者激励与约束机制 摘 要 调动企业经营者的积极性是企业发展的关键。经营者在企业活动中处于领导和指挥地位，是企业的决策者。他们素质的高低和积极性发挥的程度，直接影响企业的发展和员工的利益。怎样发挥经营者的作用，对经营者采取什么样的激励手段，是摆在我们面前的一个重要课题。就目前而言，众多国企对经营者采取的激励手段都相对单一，最大的激励往往是“加官晋职”，难以调动其千方百计追求效益等方面的内在驱动力。所以侵占、转移企业资产的“59岁现象”日益突出。 我国国企采取委托代理制，经营者由国家任命或聘用，这样在企业改制中容易出现对代理人约束不健全，导致代理人行为短期化，甚至不按照国家和股东意愿来经营国有和其他股东资产，国有资产流失严重。因此，在以代理制为实质的公司结构中，必须建立对经营者的有效约束机制。 本文以震惊全国的东方锅炉（集团）股份有限公司股票贪污案为例，以委托代理和人性假设理论为指导，从不同侧面对国企经营者的激励和约束机制进行分析，并与西方发达国家的做法进行比较，肯定成绩，找出差距，为我国国有企业经营者激励和约束探索有效的途径。 关键词：股票/国企/经营者/激励/约束 THE STATE ENTERPRISE OPERATOR’S INCENTIVE AND RESTRAINT MECHANISM VIEWED FROM “DONGFANG BOILER” STOCK CORRUPTION CASE ABSTRACT Bringing the operators of an enterprise into active play is a key to its developing. The operators are in a leading and directing position, and they are the decision makers of an enterprise. The levels of their competence and the extent they give full play to their enthusiasm, directly affect an enterprise’s development and its workers’ profits. It is an important topic that we are facing how to bring them into full play and what incentive measures shall be adopted. Here and now, the incentive measures which many state enterprises adopt to the operators are relatively simple?the biggest incentive was “advancing in rank and position”, which hardly aroused their intrinsic motivation to pursue benefits by every possible means. So the “59-years-old phenomenon” to converse and transfer the enterprise property are becoming increasingly prominent. The state enterprises of China adopt principal-agent system, and the operators are entrusted by the state through assignment or appointment. As such, in those enterprises which a corporation system reform is conducted, the restraints to the agent are not perfect and effective, resulting that the agent behaviors are of short term and even more, the agent does not operate the properties of the state and other stockholders according to their wishes. The loss of the state property is serious. Therefore, in