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A Protection Architecture for Enterprise Networks(and comments on security-centric network design);What I’m Going to Talk About;Remember .. this is Clean Slate;Public vs. Private Networks; ; ; ;Motivation Punch Line;Defining Connectivity;Defining Connectivity (the bad);Control Over Routing;Centralized Trust and Control;Restrict Access to Information;Retrofitting Security onto IP;Inflexible Hard to move a machine  (yet difficult to know if someone has moved) Really difficult to deploy a new protocol Brittle Change a firewall rule, break security policy Add a switch, break security policy Confusing Many disparate point solutions State = a bunch of soft state Hard to state meaningful policies Lose redundancy Introduce choke points Cant migrate routes b/c of all the soft state ;Argument Thus Far;Lets Start from Scratch;Instead of;Momentary Detour;SANE;Capability Provides Isolation Layer;SANE:Action Sequence!;SANE:Overview;Permission check before connectivity(Users only access resources they have permission to) Policy enforced at every switch Centralized, simply policy declaration (topology independent) Control of routes Information restricted to administrator Authenticated end hosts (bound to location);Central point for connection logging (DC) Addition of switches (redundancy) does not undermine security policy Anti-mobility ;But …;Switches construct spanning tree Rooted at DC Switches don’t learn topology(just neighbors) Provides basic datagram service to DC ;Switches authenticate with DCand establish symmetric key Ike2 for key establishment All subsequent packets to DC have “authentication header”(similar to ipsec esp header) ;Establishing Topology;Centralized? (and you call yourself a network researcher);Use first packet of flow for permission check Ports, IP addresses Can guess application type Instead of source routes use virtual circuits Instead of replacing switches, add “bumps” ;Connection Setup;Easing Deployment;Status;Network Supp