(RW)Gilles Fauconnier, Mappings in Thought and Language英文版本.pdfVIP

152 BOOK REVIEWS I have focused this review on several of the large questions that Allen and Bekoff’s book addresses. Space limitations prevent me from examining other very interesting issues the book discusses. Particularly provocative is Allen and Bekoff’s argument that Ruth Millikan’s (1984) theory of content provides a better frame- work for cognitive ethology than Dennett’s (1983) well-known hierarchy of inten- tional orders. There is also Allen and Bekoff’s suggestion that the ability to detect misinformation provides evidence of consciousness. In short, Species of Mind has intelligent and challenging things to say about many of the problems that a study of animal minds must confront. Those with an interest in animal minds will want to read this book.1 Notes 1For useful discussion, I am grateful to Eric Saidel, Elliott Sober, and Ann Wolf. References Allen, C., and Bekoff, M. (1994), ‘Intentionality, Social Play, and Definition’, Biology and Philosophy 9, pp. 63–74. Allen, C., and Bekoff, M. (1995), ‘Cognitive Ethology and the Intentionality of Animal Behavior’, Mind and Language 10, pp. 313–328. Bekoff, M. (1995), ‘Play Signals as Punctuation: The Structure of Social Play in Canids’, Behaviour 132, pp. 419–429. Bekoff, M., and Allen, C. (1992), ‘Intentional Icons: Towards an Evolutionary Cognitive Ethology’, Ethology 91, pp. 1–16. Dennett, D. C. (1969), Content and Consciousness, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Dennett, D. C. (1983), ‘Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The “Panglossian Paradigm” Defended’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6, pp. 343–390. Heyes, C., and Dickinson, A. (1990), ‘The Intentionality of Animal Action’, Mind and Language 5, pp. 87–104. Millikan, R. (1984), Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories , Cambridge: MIT Press. Stich, S. (1983), From Folk Psyc