供应链库存与信息定价策略分析-企业管理专业论文.docxVIP

华 华 中 科 技 大 学 硕 士 学 位 论 文 II II Abstract Better future demand information can help companies make better production plans, low down the cost, and improve the whole supply chain performance. As the information usually is costly, decision maker needs to balance its cost and value, then to determine how much information to acquire. In this paper, we consider a two level supply chain, in which a supplier sells his products to a retailer at wholesale price. Prior to placing an order with the supplier, retailer has an option to acquire forecasting information from external information consultants companies. In an integrated setting, we model this problem as a two-stage dynamic program, and derive the optimal inventory and information acquisition strategy while the information price falls in different range. Based on that result, we analyze the pricing game between these two information companies, and find out the Nash equilibrium of information pricing, then compare it with that determined in a decentralized setting. We show that: while the wholesale price and product cost is low, information companies turn to increase their information price, and the price variance described in the Nash equilibrium also increases; oppositely, while the product cost is low but the wholesale price is high, the information price of the both parties, and the price variance decreases. Finally, we analyze two kinds of supply chain contracts (buyback, revenue sharing) to examine that if the Nash equilibrium remains unchanged, what kinds of condition they need to meet. The results of this paper have implications for information acquisition, information pricing and inventory strategy in decision-making problems. Key words: Supply Chain Management Information Acquisition Information Pricing Game Theory PAGE PAGE IV 目 录 摘 要 I AbstractII 1 绪论 1.1 论文研究的背景、目的与意义(1) 1.2 论文内容与结构 (3) 2 国内外文献综述 2.1 国外研究现状 (5) 2.2 国内研究现状 (10) 3 集中化供应链建模与求解 3.1 模型假设与符号说明 (12) 3.2 产品库存与信息购买决策分析(15) 3.3 信息定