产品市场竞争地位、管理层权力与横向交叉持股-财务管理专业论文.docxVIP

中 中文摘要 万方数据 万方数据 交叉持股是一种特殊的股权结构。广义的交叉持股既包括企业间直接的相互持股，又包括 间接的单向持股。20 世纪 90 年代，交叉持股被作为国有企业股份制改革的手段引入我国；随 着制度背景的变化，交叉持股在我国资本市场高度活跃，企业选择交叉持股的动机也越发多元 化，引起了理论界的关注。本研究试图进一步细化我国现有的交叉持股文献，专门针对同行业 竞争企业间的交叉持股，探讨外部的产品市场竞争和内部的管理层权力两个因素是否、以及如 何影响这种横向的交叉持股行为，以期对企业的资本运作和政府的市场监管有所启示。 本研究采用理论分析与实证检验相结合的方法，首先整理了国内外探讨产品市场竞争与横 向交叉持股、以及管理层代理问题与交叉持股的文献，同时梳理了我国特殊的制度背景对交叉 持股实践产生的影响。在这个过程中，本研究发现公司的产品市场竞争地位和管理层代理问题 均对横向交叉持股行为产生影响，于是将问题追溯至产业经济学的横向兼并理论与公司治理研 究的委托代理理论，提出三个研究假设。通过对 2007 年-2013 年我国存在横向交叉持股行为的 上市公司及其配对样本的 logit 回归模型发现：公司的市场份额和管理层权力均与横向交叉持 股行为显著正相关；并且，当公司的市场份额越小，权力越大的管理者越倾向于选择横向交叉 持股。从而证实了产品市场竞争和管理层权力是影响我国企业选择横向交叉持股的两大因素。 关键词：交叉持股，市场竞争地位，管理层权力 Ⅰ Ab Abstract Cross shareholding is a specific equity structure. The generalized definition includes not only the direct mutual shareholding but also the partial ownership arrangement. Cross shareholding was applied as an approach to the SOE joint-stock reform in early 1990s; And as the institutional background changing, it was popularly conducted by the Chinese companies, which arouses attentions from the academic research about its underlying agents. The basic objective of this paper is to study on how the market competition and managerial power influence the special cross shareholding between competitive companies, i.e., the horizontal cross shareholding. So this paper is a more refining research on cross shareholding, attempting to give some reference to the companies and the regulators. The research combines both the theoretical analysis and empirical study. The paper first gives a literature review of cross shareholding from the perspective of market competition and corporate governance, and also a briefing of cross shareholding practice under the special Chinese institutional background. From the above literature and practice, the research finds that the horizontal merger acquisition theory and agency theory could explain the agents of horizontal cross shareholding. Based on the theoretical analysis, the paper gives three assumptions f