管理层收购困境中的债权人回收率[文献翻译].docVIP

原文： Secured Creditor Recovery Rates from Management Buy-outs in Distress 1. Introduction Considerable attention has been devoted to the role of debt in management (MBOs) and leveraged buy-outs (LBOs). High leverage has been argued to play an important role in committing management to improve efficiency (Jensen, 1986). MBO loan agreements tend to contain more covenants than general corporate lending agreements with specialist secured creditors also engaging in close monitoring (Citron, Robbie and Wright, 1997). Buy-out specialists may increase monitoring that substitutes for tighter debt terms (Cotter and Peck, 2001). High leverage in MBO/LBO transactions has been argued to trigger bankruptcy at a point that preserves greater going concern value than in firms that are predominantly equity financed (Jensen, 1991). Andrade and Kaplan (1998) show for a sample of 31 highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) that became distressed, that the value of the distressed HLTs did not decline and that the costs of financial distress amounted to 10-20 per cent of firm value. This literature suggests that secured creditors will recoup substantial proportions of the funds they extend to finance the initial buy-out. However, as yet there is no evidence either on the extent of credit recovery by secured lenders in MBOs nor on the factors that influence the extent of this recovery. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the process by which secured creditors recover funds they have extended to MBOs, this paper utilizes evidence from a unique dataset of 42 failed buy-outs compiled by the authors. Compilation of the dataset involved the monitoring of a cohort of MBOs from deal completion to receivership and detailed archival analysis of the reports of the receivers. We find that on average, 62 per cent of secured credit is recovered when buy-outs enter the receivership process. This is comparable with the 70 per cent found to be recovered by banks in Franks and Sussman’s (2000) study of p