东亚汇率问题(麦金农).pptVIP

The East Asian Dollar Standard and China’s Exchange Rate Ronald McKinnon Stanford University April, 2005 The Exchange Rate Debate in the 1990s Before 1997, East Asian countries, except for Japan, “softly” pegged their exchange rates to the U.S. dollar. 1997-98 Crisis: Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Korea, and Malaysia are attacked and devalue—with bankruptcies and economic downturns spreading contagiously. The IMF blames the soft pegging for encouraging over borrowing and current account deficits leading unsustainable dollar and yen debts. It warns against any return to dollar pegging. Williamson (2000), Kawai (2002), Ogawa and Ito (2002)—suggest weighting the Japanese yen more heavily in the currency baskets of the smaller East Asian economies in the face of wide fluctuations in the yen/dollar rate. The Debate In the New Millennium By 2003 into 2005, the East Asian “crisis” and non crisis economies had returned to soft dollar pegging. China and Hong Kong retained hard pegs through the crisis, and Malaysia pegged in Sept 1998 at 3.8 ringgit per dollar. Even the yen/dollar rate is more stable. But now all East Asian countries run large current account surpluses—even with net inflows of FDI (China). In 2003 and 2004, only massive official interventions kept their exchange rates from appreciating. Intensified pressure from the IMF, the G-7, and the U.S. Treasury, for China to appreciate: “There should be more flexible currencies, not only for China but the whole of Asia” Rodrigo de Rato, IMF Managing Director, 29 Sept 2004 at IMF-World Bank Meetings in Washington. Table 3: East Asian Current Accounts in Comparison to the U.S., 1990-2003 This Paper and McKinnon Book (2005) The Case for Asian Dollar Pegs East Asian economies Have sufficient fiscal and monetary control to target exchange rates, but have more difficulty targeting domestic inflation independently. Are becoming highly integrated economically with more than 50% of trade with each other. They need