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cycles of conditional cooperation in a real-time voluntary contribution mechanism周期的条件在一个实时的合作自愿贡献机制.pdf

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cycles of conditional cooperation in a real-time voluntary contribution mechanism周期的条件在一个实时的合作自愿贡献机制

Games 2011, 2, 1-15; doi:10.3390/g2010001 OPEN ACCESS games ISSN 2073-4336 /journal/games Article Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism M. Vittoria Levati and Ro’i Zultan ,⋆ Max Planck Institute of Economics, Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany Department of Cognitive, Perceptual and Brain Sciences, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AP, UK ⋆ Author to whom correspondence should be addressed; E-Mail: r.zultan@ucl.ac.uk. Received: 30 September 2010; in revised form: 14 December 2010 / Accepted: 4 January 2011 / Published: 14 January 2011 Abstract: This paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. We deﬁne contribution cycles as the number of contributors a player waits for before committing to a further contribution, and use a permutation test on contribution cycles to assign a measure of conditional cooperation to each group play. The validity of the measures is tested in an experiment. We ﬁnd that roughly 20% of the plays exhibit dynamics of conditional cooperation. Moreover, notwithstanding a decline in contributions, conditional cooperation is found to be stable over time. Keywords: public goods game; real-time protocol; information feedback; conditional cooperation 1. Introduction It is a well-established stylized fact that individuals contribute voluntarily to public goods even when material self-interes