the hard problem of cooperation合作的难题.pdfVIP

The Hard Problem of Cooperation Kimmo Eriksson1,2*, Pontus Strimling1 ¨ 1 Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden, 2 School of Education, Communication and Culture, Malardalen University, ¨ ˚ Vasteras, Sweden Abstract Based on individual variation in cooperative inclinations, we define the ‘‘hard problem of cooperation’’ as that of achieving high levels of cooperation in a group of non-cooperative types. Can the hard problem be solved by institutions with monitoring and sanctions? In a laboratory experiment we find that the answer is affirmative if the institution is imposed on the group but negative if development of the institution is left to the group to vote on. In the experiment, participants were divided into groups of either cooperative types or non-cooperative types depending on their behavior in a public goods game. In these homogeneous groups they repeatedly played a public goods game regulated by an institution that incorporated several of the key properties identified by Ostrom: operational rules, monitoring, rewards, punishments, and (in one condition) change of rules. When change of rules was not possible and punishments were set to be high, groups of both types generally abided by operational rules demanding high contributions to the common good, and thereby achieved high levels of payoffs. Under less severe rules, both types of groups did worse but non-cooperative types did worst. Thus, non-cooperative groups profited the most from being governed