Dworkin Social Rules and Legal Theory 德沃金 社会规则与法律理论.pdfVIP

Social Rules and Legal Theory Author(s): Ronald M. Dworkin Source: The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 81, No. 5 (Apr., 1972), pp. 855-890 Published by: The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc. Stable URL: /stable/795153 Accessed: 22/08/2008 09:57 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use, available at /page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at /action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ylj. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@. Social Rules and Legal Theory Ronald M. Dworkint In 1967 I published an article in which I argued that the central propositions of the legal theory I called positivism were in error and must be abandoned.1 In I that it is to particular, argued wrong sup- pose, as that theory does, that in every legal system there will be some commonly recognized fundamental test for dete