GAME THEORY University of California, Los （博弈论加州大学洛杉矶）.pdfVIP

GAME THEORY Thomas S. Ferguson Part III. Two-Person General-Sum Games 1. Bimatrix Games — Safety Levels. 1.1 General-Sum Strategic Form Games. 1.2 General-Sum Extensive Form Games. 1.3 Reducing Extensive Form to Strategic Form. 1.4 Overview. 1.5 Safety Levels. 1.6 Exercises. 2. Noncooperative Games. 2.1 Strategic Equilibria. 2.2 Examples. 2.3 Finding All PSE’s. 2.4 Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies. 2.5 Exercises. 3. Models of Duopoly. 3.1 The Cournot Model of Duopoly. 3.2 The Bertrand Model of Duopoly. 3.3 The Stackelberg Model of Duopoly. 3.4 Entry Deterrence. 3.5 Exercises. 4. Cooperative Games. 4.1 Feasible Sets of Payoff Vectors. 4.2 Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility. 4.3 Cooperative Games with Non-Transferable Utility. 4.4 End-Game with an All-In Player. 4.5 Exercises. III – 1 PART III. Two-Person General-Sum Games 1. Bimatrix Games — Safety Levels The simplest case to consider beyond two-person zero-sum games are the two-person non-zero-sum games. Examples abound in Economics: the struggle between labor and management, the competition between two producers of a single good, the negotiations between buyer and seller, and so on. Good reference material may be found in books of Owen and Straffin already cited. The material treated in Part III is much more oriented to economic theory. For a couple of good references with emphasis on applications in economics, consult the books, Game Theory for Applied Economists by Robert Gibbons (1992), Princeton University Press, and Game Theory with Economic Applications by H. Scott Bierman and Luis Fernandez (1993), Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. Inc. 1.