game theory lecture6博弈论.pptx

;Game theory;Sequential Movement;sequential rationality;Example 1: Extensive Form Prisoners’ Dilemma;Example 1: Extensive Form Prisoners’ Dilemma;The Extensive-Form Game;The Extensive-Form Game;Game Trees;Sequential Rationality and Backward Induction;backward induction in games;Example 1: War game (Burning the Bridge);Example 1: War game (Burning the Bridge);Example 2: Student vs. Professor;Example 2: Student vs. Professor;Example 2: Student vs. Professor;Example 3: commitment and backward induction;Example 3: Entrant Game (Chain Store Paradox);How to make commitment?;Example 4: Stackelberg Competition;Example 4: Stackelberg Competition;Firm 1 will maximize its own profit 1 choosing q1, knowing that firm 2’s choice would be q2 = q2 (q1) = (90-q1)/2 max Π 1 = (100-q1- q2)q1-10q1 =90q1-q21 –{(90-q1)/2}q1 =45q1-q21 /2 FOC : 45 -q1 = 0 Hence, q1 = 45; q2 =(90-q1) /2=45 ;Example 4: Stackelberg Competition;Backward Induction;game of perfect information;A Class Game Example;A Class Game Example;;;;;;;Zermelo’s Theorem;Zermelo’s Theorem;;Example 5: Centipede Game;Example 5: Centipede Game;Example 5: Centipede Game;