Strategic environmental policy and international trade：（战略性环境政策和国际贸易）.pdfVIP

Journal of Public Economics 54 (1994) 325-338. North-Holland Strategic environmental policy and international trade Scott Barrett* Faculty of Economics, London Business School, Sussex Place, Regent’s Park, London NW1 4SA, UK and Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment, University College London, Gower Street, London WCIE 6BT, UK Received April 1992, final version received September 1992 This paper demonstrates that governments may have incentives to impose weak environmental standards on industries that compete for business in imperfectly competitive international markets, where ‘weak’ means that the marginal cost of abatement is less than the marginal damage from pollution. However, such an intervention is not as efficient as an export or RD subsidy in improving competitiveness, and depending on the form of competition and market structure, it may instead be optimal for governments to impose strong environmental standards, where ‘strong’ means that the marginal cost of abatement exceeds the marginal environmental damage. The existence of less strict environmental standards in a lower income country . . . is not a sufficient basis for claiming that the environmental standards are ‘too low’ or that the country is manipulating its environmental standards in order to improve the competitiveness of its producers. To substantiate such a claim, it would be necessary at the very least to demonstrate that the standards are even lower than would be expected on the basis of such factors as the level of per