壹、研究背景及目的-Relationship-SpecificInvestments.PDFVIP

Relationship-Specific Investments and pay-for-performance: the impact of corporate governance * Chao-Jung Chen Department of Accounting Chung Yuan Christian University chjung@.tw Chung-Yuan Hsu Department of Accounting National Chengchi University cyhsu@.tw * Corresponding author 200, Chung Pei Road, Chung Li, Taiwan 32047, R. O. C. 886(3)265-5316, 886(3)265-5399 (Fax). We thank Nathan Nunn and James E. Rauch for the data on whether or not an input is sold on an organized exchange. The financial support from the National Science Council is greatly acknowledged (Project No NSC 99-2410-H-033-012-). Relationship-Specific Investments and pay-for-performance: the impact of corporate governance Abstract This study investigates whether the relative importance of earnings- and return-based performance measures in CEO compensation contracts is affected by industry-level relationship-specific investments and corporate governance. Using data f rom 1993 to 2008, we find that CEO compensation is more sensitive to firm ’s performance for firms that depend on relationship-specifi c investments, with greater sensitivity to performance based on stock returns than on earnings. This phoneme is more obvious in strong corporate governance firm. However, for relat