基于暗标拍卖理论的最优电力竞价机制分析_张新华.pdfVIP

　2007 4 4 　 :1000-6788(2007)04-0099-08 张新华, 叶　泽 (, 410076) :　, , , , ;, , .5 , :, ;, , , , . :　;;;; :　TM73;F123.9　　　　　　　　:　A　　　 Analysis on Optimal Electric Power idding Mechanism based on Sealed-bid Auction ZHANG Xin-hua, YE Ze (School of Management , Changsha University of Science Technology, Changsha 410076, China) Abstract:　This paper presents a type of electric power bidding mechanisms based on sealed-bid auction theory, and models generation company s equilibrium bidding with order statistic principle, in which the cases that the same and different generation capacity among generation companys is considered, then analyzes the relation between the market clear price and bidding mechanism to explore the optimal bidding mechanism from the view of market efficiency.At last, a numerical simulation that the bidding market consisting of five generation companies is presented, and the conclusion is drawnthat marketefficiency is indifferent almostwhen elecreic power demandisfewer or larger extremely under different bidding mechanism, and when power demand is normal the uniform-price bidding mechanism is most efficient if generation capacity is same among generation companies, but the optimal bidding mechanism is uncertain if generation capacity is different among generation companies. Key words:　sealed-bid auction;order statistic;numerical simulation;electric power bidding mechanism;power market 0 　 , , , :(Uniform-Price)(Pay-As- id, PA ); , ;PA , . .1999 , , (FERC)PX ISO , PA , .PA , , 2001 3 PA :2006-01-09 : 　　:(1973-), , , , 、, E-mail:xyu7302 @163.com. 100