季度收入模式和盈余管理外文翻译.docVIP

外文文献翻译 原文： Quarterly Earnings Patterns and Earnings Management Empirical evidence suggests that firms manage earnings to avoid reporting losses or earnings decreases or to meet analysts expectations. If firms manage earnings to meet or beat a target number, adjustments to earnings are likely to be made when the excess or shortfall from the target becomes known. Hence, the timing of manipulation is likely to be a critical distinguishing feature that could provide a means to detect such target management behavior. Consistent with this view, investment experts caution investors to watch out for late-year surges in revenues and earnings, which they regard as telltale signs of earnings manipulation. Articles in the business press dating back to the 1990s cite cases of technology companies reporting disproportionate increases in revenues and earnings in the fourth quarter. In this paper, we exploit the timing constraint on a firms ability to manage to a target and examine whether the pattern of quarterly earnings can provide an indication of potential earnings management. Our focus on potential earnings management in the fourth quarter implicitly suggests that managers have greater incentives to manage annual rather than quarterly results. In support of our assumption, most accounting-based performance measures used in bonus and compensation schemes are based on audited annual earnings. Also, if capital market participants perceive audited annual earnings as more credible than interim earnings, they may place a higher value on annual earnings, providing managers with stronger incentives to manipulate annual earnings. Thus, although managers may have greater opportunities to manipulate interim earnings because of the absence of an independent audit, their incentives to manage earnings in interim quarters may be weaker. The vast literature on earnings management relies on an accrual expectation model to estimate abnormal or discretionary accruals. Empirical studies typicall