关联交易下的盈余管理外文翻译.docVIP

外文文献翻译 Earnings Management through Affiliated Transactions Prior research has primarily tested for earnings management under the premise that the discretion allowed in recording accruals gives rise to earnings management behavior (Healy and Wahlen 1999). These studies have found evidence consistent with managers using discretionary accruals to report earnings in accordance with certain managerial incentives (e.g., avoid losses, maintain an earnings trend, meet analysts forecasts, maximize bonuses, avoid debt covenants, minimize political costs, increase offering price, etc.). We extend prior research by focusing on an additional source of earnings management. Besides accrual manipulations, firms may also engage in earnings management through transactions with affiliated companies. That is, instead of relying on the judgment afforded by generally accepted accounting principles in recording accruals, a dominant company may use its influential relationship over an affiliated company to structure transactions between the two companies in a way that allows profits to be shifted from the affiliate to the dominant company. The dominant company reports higher profits and the affiliate reports lower profits, while the profitability of the economic entity as a whole remains unaffected. Since the value of the dominant company is directly linked to the profitability and well being of the entire economic entity, this type of earnings management may cause users of the dominant companys financial statements to be misled. There are several potential ways that companies could manage earnings using transactions with affiliated companies. Firms may engage in channel stuffing by forcing distributors to purchase higher than normal inventory levels, thus increasing the manufacturers sales and profits for the current period. Firms could also manage earnings using transactions with less than wholly owned subsidiaries. Suppose a parent company sells inventory to a less than wholly owned sub