公司规定以及利润分享：一个实物期权的方法外文翻译.docVIP

原文： Firm Regulation and Profit-Sharing: A Real Option Approach In reference to the economic literature on the regulation of firms, our paper takes stock of the studies on drastic regulatory changes such as stochastic regulatory review (Bawa and Sibley, 1984) and expropriation by the regulator (Salant and Woroch, 1992; Gilbert and Newbery, 1994). Bawa and Sibley (1984) show that the firm’s incentive to indulge in over-capitalization can be tempered by the fact that this raises profits and - consequently - makes it more likely that the regulator will cut prices; in contrast to their approach, which emphasizes strategic firm behavior vies a vies both the likelihood regulator review and price adjustment, we focus on the regulator’s decision to impose a regulatory review in the form of a PS rule and on the informational conditions which makes it enforceable. Salant and Woroch (1992) and Gilbert and Newbery (1994) present models on expropriation by the regulator where the price regulation occurs endogenously as a self-enforcing and mutually beneficial cooperative equilibrium. In both those discrete-time repeated game frameworks, the regulatory lag does not affect the players’ behavior. In contrast, in our continuous-time repeated game model, the explicit unilateral approach to contract renewal- i.e. the regulator sets the PS rule or calls for contract closure - allows us either to determine the regulatory lags endogenously or to study its determinants. Specifically, in our framework, the endogenously of the regulatory lag consistently belongs both to the level of the firm’s profit and the regulator’s revocation cost. 1 The optimal PS rule The PS rule is then a process proportional to, parameterized by the initial condition, right-continuous, non-decreasing and non-negative, defined as: In the previous section we have modeled the PS rule (5) for a given exogenous upper bound value. We now need to define which value triggers the regulator’s PS introduction as well as