基于非公平规避的团队激励结构设计及对搭便车问题的解释_.docVIP

 基于非公平规避的团队激励结构设计及对 搭便车问题的解释#? 钟美瑞，孟湘泓，谭娜* 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 （中南大学商学院，长沙 410083） 摘要：从社会偏好视角对标准的团队激励模型做出分析，指出其根本缺陷是假设中忽视了团 队成员的社会偏好。然后，利用已经发展的博弈实验证据说明这种社会偏好对自私自利偏 离是系统的，而不是个别现象，并对两种应用最为广泛的非公平规避模型进行剖析。以此 为基础，利用价值函数探究非公平规避融入激励契约中效用函数的形式，并借鉴该效用函 数具体分析公平偏好对团队成员努力水平和团队激励结构设计的影响，从而证明公平偏好 可以提高团队成员的努力水平，实现预算平衡的激励相容条件，解决搭便车问题。该研究 将丰富一种新兴分析范式—行为激励契约理论的内容。 关键词：非公平规避；团队生产；搭便车；社会偏好 中图分类号：F062.5 Design of team incentive structure and explanation of free-riding problem based on inequity averse ZHONG Meirui, Meng Xianghong, TAN Na (School of Business,Changsha 410083) Abstract: The paper analyzes standard team incentive model from the perspective of social preferences, and then points out the fundamental shortcoming that it overlooks social preferences of individual in group in assumption of standard team incentive models. Afterward, the paper shows that the departure of social preferences to self-concern is systemic, but not individual through many existent evidences of game experiment, and takes apart two kinds inequity adverse which are being comprehensively used. On the basis of these, the paper explores the forms how inequity adverse is to be incorporated utility function by value function, and analyzes the effective of equity preference on the level of team member’s effort and team incentive structure via above utility function, and then has showed that equity preference may improve the level of team member’s effort and realizes incentive compatibility condition of budget balance, and resolves free-riding problem. Finally, the researches will enrich new rising analytical paradigm -behavioral contract theory.) Key words: inequity adverse; team production; free-riding; social preferences 0 引言 AlchianDemsetz(1972)在继承 Caose(1937)提出的交易费用理论突破古典经济学假设基 础下，重点研究了企业内部结构的激励问题（监督成本），从而提出了团队生产理论。从 AlchianDemsetz 对团队定义也可以看出，团队生产的不可分割性、行为难以监督性和产出 计量难题，导致了某些团队成员的偷懒行为，即团队生产中“搭便车”问题。对于团队生产 中搭便车问题，主要存在以下解释模型：AlchianDemsetz 提出从团队外引入一个分享剩余 基金项目：教育部博士点基金新教师项目“中国情景下经理人非公平规避的实验评估及应用研究” （2008